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ABSTRACT
Cityfront Center is a 60-acre site at the juncture of the
Chicago River and Lake Michigan, at the northeastern boundary
of the central business district in Chicago, Illinois. The
entire project was zoned under a single plan for development
in only 18 months from the time the master plan was
presented to the city for approval. The development and
design guidelines established for this project have been
heralded as precedent-setting for future developments.
An analysis of the master planner's design and Chicago's
review and approval processes was conducted to understand how
this project could receive its approvals in a far shorter time
period than would be possible in other major metropolitan
cities such as Boston, New York, and San Francisco. The
project was also studied to determine how the lessons learned
during the design and approval of Cityfront Center may be
transferred to other projects both in Chicago and in other
cities.
Key participants in the approvals process, including the joint
venture partners, Chicago Dock and Canal Trust and Equitable
Life Assurance Society, as well as designers, public planners
and civic interest groups, were consulted in the evaluation of
the design and approval of Cityfront Center. Developers and
planners were also questioned for comparison and contrast of
Chicago's approvals process with those of other cities.
Primary research was augmented with newspaper and periodical
articles and materials submitted to the Planning Department of
the City of Chicago for review and approval.
The research showed that cities such as Boston and San
Francisco are much more involved in the initial planning and
review of projects. Chicago's process also does not include
detailed design review for aesthetics found in these other
cities. These differences reflect the pro-development
attitude of Chicago's city government, the greater authority
given to the Boston Redevelopment Authority and the San
Francisco Planning Department, and the more lenient
as-of-right zoning governing the City of Chicago.
Nonetheless, the design of projects in Chicago appear to be of
a quality equal to that of many other cities due to the strong
and long-standing architectural heritage established in
Chicago. The guidelines established for Cityfront Center have
already been used as a model in planning the redevelopment of
other areas near Chicago's central business district. The
usefulness of the project's 60-acre master plan as applied to
future developments may be limited due to the large size of
Cityfront Center and its ownership by a single entity.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Wheeler
Visiting Professor, Department of
Urban Studies and Planning
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1. INTRODUCTION 5
2. HISTORY OF THE SITE 11
3. CHICAGO DOCK - EQUITABLE VENTURE STRATEGY 30
Learning from the Past
Simplicity
Open Spaces
Flexibility and Commitment of Developers
Phasing
Negotiation Strategy
Infrastructure
4. THE DESIGN AND APPROVALS PROCESS 45
The Master Plan
Cooper's Expertise
Development Guidelines
Response of Civic Organizations
A. Access to Cityfront Center from Michigan Avenue
through Pioneer Court
B. Funding for Infrastructure Improvements
C. The Treatment of Ogden Slip
D. The Upfront Planning of Du Sable Park
E. Traffic and Parking
F. Phasing and Ongoing Accountability
5. INTERNAL DESIGN GUIDELINES 63
6. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DESIGN AND APPROVAL PROCESS 70
Private Planning in a Public Arena
Public Design Review
Transferability of the Design and Approvals Processes
Established at Cityfront Center
The Chicago Approvals Process
Quality of Chicago Design and Architecture
EXHIBITS 90
ENDNOTES 95
BIBLIOGRAPHY 100
Interviews
References
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The public approvals process for new developments in
cities such as Boston, New York, and San Francisco is widely
regarded as being restrictive, very subjective, and sometimes
inconsistent. Development negotiations typically involve a
myriad of public and private interest groups and are complex,
controversial, and charged with emotion. Yet despite the time
and energy invested by all parties, the results do not
necessarily represent a consensus of opinion nor good design,
in the eyes of both architecture critics and the public. A
protracted and complicated review and approvals process does
not guarantee the design and quality of a project. The issues
are too subjective to be solved by answers that are absolutely
"black or white." Bill Martin, a past planner with the City
of Chicago, believes it is "an impossible task" for a city to
attempt to completely control the aesthetic issues of a new
development. He explains the dilemma: "To [be able to control
all aspects of design] would be saying that, somewhere out
there, there is a group of people able to dictate what's
correct and say, 'yes, that is the way a building should be
designed.'
If Boston, New York and San Francisco represent the
highly (some would say overly) regulated extreme of the
approvals process, then Houston represents the opposite end of
the spectrum with almost no regulation at all. This thesis
examines Cityfront Center, a large planned development located
in Chicago. Chicago's more balanced and reasonable review
process comes closer to representing the zoning philosophy of
most American cities. The cities with intense design review
and highly restrictive zoning seem to approach planning for
urban development from an adversary perspective. By contrast,
Chicago seems to approach planning from a more cooperative,
consensus-oriented perspective.
Cityfront Center is located on 60 acres of privately held
land, just northeast of Chicago's central business district,
at the juncture of the Chicago River and Lake Michigan. When
completed, the 22 million square foot project will mix hotel,
office, retail, and residential uses on one of Chicago's
premier waterfront sites. In only eighteen months the joint
venture developers of this project negotiated and received
public approvals for the master planned development. The
approvals process was time and cost efficient and produced a
result that seems to please most all parties involved in the
project. The master plan and development guidelines designed
for the site lay the ground work for a potentially stunning
project and have already set a precedent for the design of
other projects in Chicago.
Cityfront Center is a particularly interesting project
because:
The approvals for so large and sensitive a site were
obtained in a surprisingly short period of time.
Notwithstanding the absence of rigid municpal design
controls, the project has been widely praised by
architects and planners.
Alexander Cooper, a New York architect who lacked a
personal knowledge of Chicago and its political
context, was nevertheless able to successfully
design the master plan for the project.
Unlike the highly regulated cities, the Chicago
Planning Department delegated most design decisions
to the developers' private planners.
The Cityfront Center experience stands in stark contrast
to development disputes that often delay projects in cities
such as Boston, New York, and San Francisco. This thesis
studies the developers' strategies to secure approvals and
analyzes why they were successful. The questions that have
guided the analysis are:
Why was such a large tract of downtown development
property able to be zoned for a PD in eighteen
months?
Did the planned development review of Cityfront
Center work fairly and efficiently in protecting
both the pubic's interest as well as the developer's
interest?
How did the design and strategy for approval adopted
by the developers aid or hinder the project's
progress?
In evaluating the design and approval of Cityfront
Center, we visited the site and spoke to representatives of
the city, community groups and joint venture. We also asked
developers, architects, and planners to compare and contrast
the Chicago approval process with that of other cities. In
all we interviewed twenty-four people, a list of whose names
is included in the bibliography. Newspaper and periodical
articles, as well as documents published by and submitted to
the City of Chicago, were used to augment our primary
research.
Chapter Two of this thesis is historical in nature; it
introduces the reader to the history of Chicago in general and
the Chicago Dock and Canal site (Cityfront Center) in
particular.
Chapters Three, Four and Five are descriptive in nature.
Chapter Three, Chicago Dock - Equitable Venture Strategy
explores the strategic approach assumed by the joint venture
partners in developing a master plan for the site. It looks
back on the lessons learned from the past and how those
lessons were applied to developing a master plan. This
chapter identifies some of the key hurdles that needed to be
overcome in the design of the master plan and discusses
how the developers went about solving those problems.
Chapter Four, The Design and Approvals Process, discusses
the master plan and the value of an experienced urban master
planner. It delves into the formation of the development
guidelines and how the civic organizations were involved in
the design and approvals process. The chapter helps to
identify the issues that were of particular interest to the
civic groups.
Chapter Five, Internal Design Guidelines, continues from
Chapter Four's discussion of design guidelines established by
the City of Chicago. The developers also established internal
design guidelines which are divided into two sections.
Section One speaks primarily to public issues such as the
installation of infrastructure improvements and open spaces.
Section Two of the standards addresses the design of the
individual buildings which will be built within the project.
These internal standards were created to set a distinctive
tone and atmosphere for the project.
Chapter Six, An Assessment of the Design and Approval
Process, is analytic in nature. This chapter discusses
private planning in a public arena and the issue of public
design review. It assesses the transferability of the
developer's and master planner's approach, that is, its
applicability to other sites in Chicago and elsewhere. The
chapter continues with an analysis of the Chicago approvals
process and the merits of that process. The chapter concludes
with the issue of quality of Chicago design and architecture
and how it relates to the review process.
At this time, the Cityfront Center development is
proceeding along the parameters prescribed and delineated in
the master plan and PD. With a glut of office space and a
generally overbuilt market in Chicago today, the pace is a bit
slower than originally anticipated. With an expected twenty
year build-out, however, it is difficult to say that the
project is behind schedule this early in its development. The
joint venture partners have now amicably gone their separate
ways. Each is pursuing the development of its share of the
project, and each is negotiating with potential developers for
individual sites. It appears that the development will have a
wide array of uses under construction within the near future.
Only as the project begins to grow in size and diversity can
the effects of the review process, the master plan, the
planned development ordinance, and the design guidelines can
be fully assessed.
CHAPTER TWO
HISTORY OF THE SITE
The history of the Chicago Dock and Canal Trust (the
Trust) is as colorful and rich as the history of Chicago
itself. Only 350 residents lived in the City of Chicago
when it incorporated in 1833 due to low, swampy lands and
biting winter winds which blew off Lake Michigan.
Nonetheless, the city's strategic location as a transportation
link between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River fueled
its prosperity. William B. Ogden, having arrived in Chicago
from New York in May, 1835, saw the area's potential for
growth and established himself in the real estate business,
buying, selling, and managing properties for himself and
eastern clients. In 1836, Ogden had the distinction to be
elected the city's first mayor, although he chose to serve
only one term.
During the 1840's and 1850's, particularly after the
completion of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, Chicago emerged
as an important transfer point between the various regions of
the United States. A reciprocity agreement with Canada also
significantly increased the number of Canadian ships in the
Chicago harbor. Finished goods from the east were sent to
Chicago to be exchanged for midwestern wheat and southern
cotton, sugar, and molasses. Aided by the midwestern
expansion of the rail system, lumber from Wisconsin and
Michigan was shipped down Lake Michigan for distribution to
settlers of the Plains states. These developments convinced
Ogden of the importance of owning and improving the property
and shipping facilities at the juncture of the Chicago River
and Lake Michigan. With these goals in mind, Ogden
established the the Chicago Dock and Canal Company in 1857.1
To insure the future of his endeavors, Ogden retained the
counsel of a rising young state politician and practicing
lawyer, Abraham Lincoln. Due to their lobbying efforts, the
Illinois legislature passed a Special Act in February, 1857,
granting a broad and extraordinary corporate charter to the
Chicago Dock and Canal Company. This charter empowered the
new company to "enclose, make and protect . . .wharves,
docks, moles, [and] piers. . .for the safety and
accommodation of boats and vessels." The company could erect
buildings and sell land, and it was also given the power of
condemnation for any additional lands it determined were
necessary for its purposes.
The site which Ogden was interested in owning was known
as "the Sands," Chicago's first vice district, "the vilest and
most dangerous place in Chicago" as reported by the Chicago
Tribune in April, 1857. Attempts to clean up this area had
failed as ownership of the land just north of the Chicago
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River had been disputed for years due to claims made by
sailors, fishermen and other squatters who had established
themselves over time. Therefore, despite the powers granted
in its charter, the Dock and Canal Company would not only have
to take legal possession, but also physical possession of the
site, if it was to stake its claim. 2
Ogden bought property from those inhabitants of the Sands
who would sell and notified the others that their homes would
be torn down, regardless of whether they left or not. On
April 20, 1857, a representative for Ogden, the sheriff, armed
with writs of eviction, thirty policemen, and a posse, entered
the Sands and demolished the buildings of those who still
refused to vacate.3 Nine buildings were torn down by noon and
a "mysterious" fire, which broke out in the afternoon,
destroyed all the remaining buildings. In clearing out the
area, Ogden would, in effect, be responsible for the first
"redevelopment" of the site, the next to take place more than
100 years later.
The outbreak of the Civil War disrupted the economy and
halted Ogden's plans for development of his land. In 1867,
after the close of the war allowed for a resumption of normal
trade activities, plans were drawn up for the extensive
construction of piers, slips, and breakwaters along the lake
and riverfront boundaries of the proprty. However, only one
of these slips - Ogden Slip - was ever constructed; although
much larger originally, it provides a major water feature even
today in the Cityfront Center redevelopment plan.4
By 1889, the eleven million tons of cargo passing through
Chicago Harbor had made it one of the busiest ports in the
world. The city of Chicago prospered from this trade, having
grown to more than a half-million residents. The Dock and
Canal Company also prospered, as marked by extensive
development on their waterfront property. Factories and
warehouses five to seven stories in height were constructed
all along the riverfront and Ogden Slip. The industries
represented various enterprises but most common were railroad,
lumber, and candy operations.
The most significant project on the site was the
construction of three furniture warehouses, collectively known
as the Pugh Warehouse, so named for James Pugh whose Furniture
Exhibition Company leased the buildings. At completion, the
Pugh Warehouse, later renamed the North Pier Terminal Building
and now North Pier Chicago, spanned more than 1,650 feet along
the Ogden Slip, making it the largest combined warehouse and
docking facility in the world.5 Although portions of the
warehouse have been demolished, it is the site of a major
redevelopment effort by Broadacre Development Company and will
play a focal part in the new Cityfront Center.
During the early 1900's, the volume of cargo traffic in
the Chicago Harbor declined precipitously, falling from the
peak of eleven million tons of cargo passing through the
harbor in 1889, to less than half, five million tons, only
twenty years later. A number of factor accounted for this
dramatic decline. The growth of the steel industry to the
south of Chicago had resulted in the construction of a larger,
more readily accessible harbor in the Lake Calumet region.
The narrowness and shallowness of the Chicago River, the
numerous rotating bridges crossing the River throughout the
city, and the lack of pier facilities along Lake Michigan
added to the plight of the harbor. In addition, construction
costs were rising, as were real estate taxes. As a
transportation hub, the ruling on the Panama Canal Act of 1912
by the Interstate Commerce Commission prohibiting railroads
from operating ships on the Great Lakes was also burdensome.
Harborfront businesses subsequently felt the effects of the
Great Depression beginning in the 1930's. 6
The Depression halted not only business activity,
but affected a project embarked upon by the City of Chicago to
connect the north and south portions of Lake Shore Drive
across the Chicago River and through the eastern portion of
the North Pier Terminal Building. By 1931, the City could no
longer sell bonds to continue and all work stopped. William
0. Green, President of the Dock and Canal Company, noted in
the 1933 Annual Report that the bridge "stands in the same
condition as a year ago, of little or no use to anyone."
Even with the eventual completion of the "Boulevard Link"
by the Roosevelt's Public Works Administration, the connection
was of little use to the Company. The roadway contained two
right-angle "S curves" (one at the southeastern corner of the
Dock and Canal property) which produced many accidents. Also,
the elevated road created a physical and psychological barrier
to the water and did not provide convenient points of ingress
and egress for the site.
Having survived the decline of the Chicago Harbor and the
Depression, the 1940's and 1950's were marked as a period of
stability and of waiting for that time when, in President
Green's vision, ". . .the character of the occupancy of at
least a part of the Company's property can be developed for a
higher use than warehouse or factory, and a consequent
increase in rent." As early as 1926, Green had voiced his
concern that the changing composition and declining level of
harborfront activity would eventually require that alternates
be found for the property to replace the storage and
manufacturing then on the site.7
In 1962, the directors reorganized the company as one of
the first real estate investment trusts (REITs) created under
newly enacted federal legislation. The main advantage of the
reorganization was that it avoided "double taxation" on
earnings by allowing the REIT to pass on income directly to
shareholders without paying corporate income taxes.
Through this reorganization, Chicago Dock and Canal
Trust, under its new name, was now positioned to participate
in the nationwide commercial and multi-family construction
boom which was taking place in the early 1960's. In addition,
the rapid growth of the North Michigan Avenue commercial
corridor to the immediate west of the Dock and Canal site and
the growth of the Streeterville high-rise residential area to
the north of the site set the stage for redevelopment plans to
take shape. 8
Nonetheless, redevelopment of the site would be slow.
Despite claims by architect Harry Weese that Dock and Canal
has been "sitting on . . .acres of the best real estate in
the country" and that it has taken far too many years to
"colonize the most exciting piece of land in this city, or any
city,"9 there were a number of significant obstacles to
surmount before the property could shed its industrial
character and participate in the growth of the area.
Most important, there were too many better office sites
downtown and residential sites in the Streeterville area (to
the north) for the Dock and Canal land, with its existing
industrial uses, to be readily marketable.10 The buildings on
the property could not all be demolished at the same time nor
did long-term leases roll over simultaneously. Moreover, as
the rental from these building leases was the primary source
of income to the Trust, their demolition made it necessary for
the Trust to accept foregone revenues in the short-term in
order to be able to prepare for future redevelopment. In
addition, there were a number of small parcels which would
have to be purchased before the property could be developed
under a comprehensive plan.
The site sat on a virtual island, making access
difficult. Already on a true peninsula created by the Chicago
River, Lake Michigan and the Ogden Slip, accessibility to the
site was further hampered due to the elevated development and
roadway systems already firmly established in much of the
central business district of Chicago and surrounding the site
to the west (development along Michigan Avenue), the south
(Illinois Center), and the east (Lake Shore Drive).
The Trust took its first step toward realizing its
redevelopment goal with the lease of three acres to the
partnership of William Hartnett, Charles Shaw, and FLUOR
Properties. In 1968, the partnership completed Lake Point
Tower, a 70-story building, known as the tallest apartment
building in the world. Lake Point Tower was quickly rented
and grew in prestige, so other developers considered
developing on sites in the Dock and Canal Trust.12 This
interest, however, triggered concerns from the citizens and
city of Chicago that views of the lake would be lost and the
lakefront privatized. In response, the Lakefront Protection
Ordinance (LPO) was passed, banning any construction east of
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Lake Shore Drive which would result in structures taller than
the thoroughfare itself. Cityfront Center is still under the
jurisdiction of this ordinance.
Throughout the 1960's, the small lots needed to complete
the Trust's overall plan were purchased. Leases coming due
were not renewed. The Trust, being "land rich and cash
poor,"13 demolished buildings as they had available funds. By
1972, 15 buildings and 22 acres had been cleared. To the
surprise of the Trust, the conversion of much of the land into
interim parking lots generated almost as much income as that
of the former leases due to increased growth in the
area.
In the early 1970's, the City of Chicago developed plans
for the extension of Columbus Drive over the Chicago River and
through the Dock and Canal site to Illinois Street. With the
completion of this extension in October, 1982, a portion of
the isolating "peninsula's" negative effects would be
mitigated and the site would finally have access to areas
south of the river. During the Cityfront Center approvals
process, the joint venture would seek additional public funds
for major infrastructure improvements to further prepare the
site for redevelopment. However, Mike Pepper, Project Manager
of the Dock and Canal/Equitable Venture, stated later that, in
the end, "the City had already thrown in their money on the
Columbus Street Bridge which opened up the site to the city."
In June, 1983, the Chicago Dock and Canal Trust joined
with The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States
(Equitable) to form the Chicago Dock-Equitable Venture (CDEV).
The Dock and Canal Trust contributed all its land holdings
along the Chicago waterfront directly north of the Chicago
River. Equitable contributed the Equitable and Mandel
buildings (located between the Dock and Canal site and
Michigan Avenue) in addition to making a cash contribution to
enable the partnership to move ahead with the planning. The
agreement resulted in the Dock and Canal Trust owning a 62
percent share of the venture while Equitable owned a 38
percent interest. The joint venture was formed to create a
comprehensive master plan, to better facilitate the planning
and approval processes, and to improve the resulting
development of the combined lands which would be called
Cityfront Center.
Despite the joint venture, the Trust retained an
indirect interest in its land and, in addition to sharing the
development risk, would benefit from Equitable's experience as
a real estate investor and developer. Through the association
with Equitable, the joint venture created an additional source
of cash flow to the Trust from its share in the income from
the Equitable and Mandel buildings to see the venture through
the planning and approvals processes. Also, the Trust now had
an important potential means of access from Michigan
Avenue.14 From Equitable's point of view, the venture gave
them joint ownership and development interest in all the
Trust's land, particularly the prime office site to the west
of the Mandel building which is soon to be the new
headquarters of the National Broadcasting Company (NBC).
Before its association with Equitable, the Dock and Canal
Trust had retained Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (SOM) to
design a master plan for the development of their site. Their
design called for thirty million square feet, "a tremendous
amount of buildable area," according to Jack Guthman, attorney
for the joint venture. "If separate builders owned each
parcel, you could build that much [under existing zoning), but
there would be no market for it." The plan also called for an
extension of the elevated structures seen elsewhere in the
North Loop area. SOM's plan was never acted upon.
After the joint venture was established, Tishman Speyer
Properties was brought in as the master developer. Skidmore,
Owings and Merrill continued its association with the project,
now in the capacity of master architect. Tishman Speyer
recommended the New York planning and architectural firm of
Cooper, Eckstut Associates (now Cooper, Robertson + Partners)
to design the development's master plan.
Alex Cooper's expertise was particularly valuable to the
joint venture as he was creating a solid reputation as a
master planner, having designed the plans for Battery Park
City and the Times Square/Forty-Second Street redevelopment in
Manhattan, Embarcadero Center in San Francisco and served as
the planning and architectural consultant to the Rockefeller
Center Development Corporation. When asked for reaction's to
Cooper's master plan for Cityfront Center, interviewees'
reactions have been swift and almost unanimous. Most often
called "sensitive" to the site and its surrounding context,
Cooper "has a great sense of space" 1 5 and brought "a whole new
perspective to the planning process." 16
The development team developed their master plan and then
approached the city planning department for its reactions.
The developers were told that publically-issued development
guidelines would be necessary before the joint venture would
be allowed to apply for its amended zoning. In a best case
scenario, the city would have previously drafted guidelines
for the area being developed with the goal of addressing the
public concerns for open space, transportation, phasing and
density. Ideally, these guidelines would have been available
to and used by the private planners in designing a master plan
or individual parcel within that area. As Bill Martin, a city
planner during the Cityfront Center approval process explains,
the city can only speculate where development will go next:
When dealing with a Plan for Development [PD], it's
best to add a step beforehand and get the issues on
the table. . .[But,] often times in Chicago,
planning is reactionary. You try to beat out the
developer [by already having development guidelines
established], but they beat you [by developing where
the planning department is not expecting it.]
Although the basis for the city's development guidelines
would be Cooper's already-designed master plan, the developers
were not allowed to proceed until the planning department drew
them up. The publication of these guidelines, however, did
provide the forum for public discussion and review, an
important issue to Elizabeth Hollander, Commissioner of
Planning and Neighborhood Development for the City of Chicago.
"She is cognizant of and sensitive to what the interest groups
think." 1 7 The draft development guidelines were
issued in December, 1984 and created discussion from a myriad
of Chicago civic interest groups. Their concerns centered
primarily around the issues of: access to Michigan Avenue
through an existing, well-known public plaza, funding for
instrastructure improvements, traffic and parking, water
circulation in Ogden Slip, and the lack of design for du Sable
Park, the major park at the juncture of the Chicago River and
Lake Michigan. (See Chapter Four for further details on the
approvals process and community reaction.)
In April, 1985, the city produced a revised version of
the Chicago Dock-Equitable Venture development guidelines
which reflected the compromises reached among the CDEV, the
city, and the community interest groups. Cooper's master
plan, together with the city's development guidelines,
provided the basis for the Residential-Business Plan of
Development, the official document amending the existing
zoning on the CDEV site. (In Chicago, a Plan for Development
is required for the development of any site in the central
business district which is greater one acre, with more than
200 linear feet of riverfront, or subject to the provisions of
the Lakefront Protection Ordinance.) On November 11, 1985,
Chicago's city council approved Cityfront Center as one of the
nation's largest planned development projects.
In December, 1985, within a month of the approval of
Cityfront Center's Planned Development Ordinance, Equitable
and the Trust dissolved the joint venture due to differing
objectives. While Equitable was experienced in real estate
development and committed to the long-term, "in-house"
development of the project, Chicago Dock and Canal, with its
ongoing concern with the availability of cash flow, saw the
opportunity to pull cash out of its long-time, illiquid
investment by selling or leasing sites to others for
development. Characterized as having a greater appetite for
risk and being less conservative than the Trust, and "with
more than $20 billion of real estate assets under management,
Equitable wanted to concentrate on the commercial side, where
risks and rewards were greater."19 Charlie Gardner, President
of the Dock and Canal Trust acknowledged, "We have different
investment motivations." 20
Another concern to the Trust was the "financial
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requirements to the west of Columbus Drive." An extensive
roadway system designed for transportation, service, and
docking access had been in place for years to the west of
Columbus and, to allow for the roadway, the Equitable, Mandel,
Tribune and Wrigley buildings it served were all constructed
thrity-five feet above grade. With this design already in
place, all new buildings west of Columbus would necessarily be
built in this same manner. "Frankly, [the infrastructure
requirements and the intensive design and landscaping of
Cityfront Plaza in front of the NBC Tower] represent an
initial expenditure that is large in relation to the trust's
financial resources."20 The investment was "too much for
Dock and Canal to 'play.'" 21
With the dissolution of the joint venture, the Trust
retained all land east of Columbus Drive and a 62% undivided
interest in the Equitable Building. Equitable retained the
remaining interest in the Equitable Building as well as its
original interest in the Mandel Building and the land on which
it sits. In addition, Equitable received the property on
which the NBC Tower is being built and all other lands owned
by the Trust to the west of Columbus Drive. The
infrastructure improvements on the divided parcels total $75
million and are split relatively equally between the two
entities. The main advantage of its division to the Trust is
that their required infrastructure improvements can be phased
25
as development occurs and will more closely match its stream
of cash flow. (Most of Equitable's capital investment is
being completed now with the construction of the NBC Tower.)
Equitable continues to engage the services of Alex Cooper,
while the Trust has retained Lohan Associates, a Chicago based
architectural and planning firm, to implement the master plan
and act as consultants on the design of future buildings
proposed by prospective developers of their property.
According to Cooper, that his plan. . .
survived the partnership's 'divorce' is perhaps the
best testimony that it is based on a workable
staging concept, with the flexibility and resilience
necessary for the multiyea52buildout that all
large-scale plans require.
As Mike Pepper explained, "From the outset, we wanted to
create something that would survive. Even now, very few of
the original players are still around and, in the end, you
have to look to the written words."
In addition to the development of Cityfront Center, Dock
and Canal was also embarking in a new direction via real
estate acquisitions outside Cityfront's boundaries and
particularly outside the city of Chicago. The Trust's intent
was to diversify its portfolio and reduce its risk. Its
efforts would also prove to be focal in the Trust's ability to
finance its portion of Cityfront Center's infrastructure cost,
primarily the extension of McClurg Court south to the river,
which would be required immediately. The program began with
the 1983 tax-deferred exchange of the Trust's land interest
under Lake Point Tower (allowing it to be condominiumized) for
ownership of the Palmolive Building located on North Michigan
Avenue (commonly referred to as the Playboy Building as the
Playboy Club was located there for many years).
After nearly fifty years of trouble arising from the now
infamous "S curve" in Lake Shore Drive south of the Chicago
River, reconstruction of the thoroughfare, completed in 1986,
further enhanced access to the Dock and Canal site from the
east, just as the extension of Columbus Drive had improved
access from the south. Dock and Canal also received $3.1
million from the State of Illinois for its portion of the land
upon which the reconstruction was built, allowing the Trust to
continue its diversification efforts by acquiring Kipling
Plaza, a shopping center in Denver, Colorado.
In 1986, the Trust also disposed of its interests in the
Palmolive Building through an exchange in which it acquired
Lincoln Garden, an office complex in Tampa, Florida and One
Michigan Avenue, an office building in Lansing, Michigan.
Waterplace Park, an office complex in Indianapolis, Indiana
was acquired in an exchange transferring the historical North
Pier Terminal to Broadacre Development Company for rehab and
conversion into retail and loft office use.
David Tinkham, Director of Finance for Dock and Canal
explained that acquisition of these properties via
tax-deferred exchanges was critical to keep the Trust from
paying the considerable capital gains taxes associated with
parcels which had been held over 130 years were now being sold
off for development. "You liquidate the REIT every time you
do it [ie. pay taxes]." Also, as Amy Hecker outlined, the
idea was for the buildings to help finance the infrastructure.
With strong operating properties, the Trust could refinance,
use the proceeds to fund the installation of the Cityfront
streets, and let the cash flow from the properties repay the
mortgages over time. An ingenious strategy for an entity that
is "land rich and cash poor."
The major portion of the first phase of infrastructure,
the extension of several primary streets, is complete. The
Trust is completing its work on the first phase with the
installation of the public plaza at the end of McClurg Court,
where the street turns to run along the river. The Dock and
Canal land is ready for development. Broadacre Properties is
rehabbing the historic North Pier Terminal for retail and loft
office use and installing a portion of the improvements around
Ogden Slip. The Trust also has several sites under option for
a hotel and residential apartments and condominiums.
Equitable Real Estate is developing a 40-story tower on
their land to be the new headquarters of the National
Broadcasting Company (NBC). A portion of Cityfront Plaza is
being constructed in conjunction with NBC Tower, the remainder
to be completed after the Mandel-Lear Building is torn down in
April, 1989.
Cityfront Center is off and running. But how did the
joint venture team create a master plan acceptable to the city
and obtain its necessary city approvals? These are the issues
which will be discussed in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE
CHICAGO DOCK - EQUITABLE VENTURE STRATEGY
At the inception of the joint venture between Chicago
Dock and Canal and Equitable Life Assurance Company, the
development team set out to put together a plan which would
best facilitate the public approvals and marketability of the
project. Retaining the urban design services of Cooper,
Eckstut Associates, led by Alexander Cooper, would prove to be
a major component of that plan. Well-known and respected for
his master plans of Battery Park City and the redevelopment of
42nd Street at Times Square in Manhattan, Alexander Cooper had
a well-defined approach to master planning:
Design is the creation of value. For large-scale
projects, a design that wins speedy approvals
(saving time and money); creates an identity and
address (adding value); integrates different but
adjacent uses; and is able to respond, through
phased development, to future changes (whethe53delays or market shifts) . . .is essential.
LEARNING FROM THE PAST
The first step in Cooper's strategy for obtaining
necessary approval was the creation of a plan which met the
agenda of the City of Chicago. The development team also
studied Illinois Center, a project the city obviously did not
want to see again. "Illinois Center was clearly in people's
minds; the community groups looked [south] across the
river. "24
Illinois Center is large-scale multi-use development
project built on the air rights over 80 acres of Illinois
Central railroad tracks and Lower Wacker Drive. The project
is "a catalogue of just about everything it is possible to do
wrong in a major downtown development." 2 5 Its extensive
infrastructure was planned during the 1960's and built during
the 1970's, largely with federal funding. The design resulted
in a "baffling" multi-level transportation and service system,
"a cavelike lower-level roadway that is one of the most dismal
vehicular gateways ever designed." The buildings are boxy,
glass structures of the "Miesan Era", an "uninspired
collection of high rises."26 Retail shops are contained in an
underground "maze where you can't feel or see sunlight."27
The public "sees high walls [from the street] and doesn't know
what's going on inside." 28
During the 1960's the design of Illinois Center may have
been the "right thing to do," but as a result of its
infrastructure, the project is "locked in" and has been unable
to adapt to changing market and public demand. The
infrastructure has created elevated pedestrian ways and major
roadway barriers which separate the public from the river and
limited landscaping in the plazas. ("Trees should be planted
in the ground, not in pits." 29 ) Designed primarily for
ease of maintenance, the public spaces have been described as
"cold, hostile, [and] brutal." Illinois Center was "designed
all for [perceived] value to the developer, not for
enlightened, [public] reasons."30
Most important and controversial to the City of Chicago
and its residents is the fact that there is no guiding plan
for Illinois Center against which development proposals for
specific buildings within the complex may be reviewed. The
city has no specific timetable to which it can hold the
developers accountable for the improvements on a five-acre
park which they promised the city. The developers claim their
obligation is not in effect until all development in Illinois
Center is completed. Yet, architect Harry Weese, in
describing this "high-rise jungle," claims that "thirty years
after the railroad freight service moved out of the front
yard, a waste of junk box cars, weeds, and dead trees
remains." 31
Although the comparison was easy and CDEV clearly wanted
to avoid this earlier project's misadventures, the joint
venture chose to learn from and yet not to capitalize on what
is now perceived as the mistakes made by the developers of
Illinois Center. Even the city planners will admit, "Today,
Ilinois Center often gets a 'bad rap. " 32 Illinois
Center "was an acceptable form in the 1970's. Large,
[unprogrammed] public gathering places were the thing to
do." 3 3 (This was also the era when Boston's controversial
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City Hall was built with its vast, empty plaza, built as a
large gathering place without much thought to warmth or
invitation to those who would use it.) "The Chicago River was
not nearly as clean then as it is today. The public wanted to
turn its back to it." 34 As a result, the developers
were careful not to belittle the design of the earlier
project. "We didn't 'use' Illinois Center [in obtaining our
approvals]. You must do your best deal and don't compare it
to others' mistakes." 35
SIMPLICITY
Alexander Cooper explains his method in designing a
master plan, "From the beginning we focus on making things
beautiful, desirable, and marketable--all of which appeals to
the private developers." He also feels accountable to the
public at large and "if you're oriented that way, you're going
to be convincing to [the city) about what's right to do.
After all, they're trying to please the general public, too."
At the crux of his designs is an "irrational commitment to
doing things simply."36 Cooper was successful in making his
intent clear, for, when asked why Cooper's plan "works" at
Cityfront Center, Phil Levin, Director of Zoning for the City
of Chicago quickly responded, "the simplicity of it."
Brian Shea, Director of Design for Cooper, Robertson +
Partners, describes the design process for any large scale
project as the "creative synthesis of all kinds of
information." The designers work to understand the nature of
the site and the factors which contribute to its central
character including the architectural characteristics of the
area, adjacent uses, density, and traffic circulation. Cooper
was also interested in reinforcing and enhancing the city's
public structure of streets, plazas, and open spaces. In
considering a plan for Cityfront Center, Shea remarked that
"the greatest problems with [Chicago] today seem to be in
those areas where development strayed from the Burnham Plan,"
the original master plan for the City of Chicago, developed in
1909 by Daniel H. Burnham. Therefore, the idea was to study
the area in which Cityfront Center was located in order to
make the development "a part of that place."
Many of those interviewed in fact commented that Cooper's
plan "didn't turn its back on the city," but instead built
upon the site's surrounding uses. City planners and community
leaders contrasted his plan with those of Illinois Center,
Renaissance Center in Detroit, and early designs for Battery
Park City in New York, which tried to create a separate
isolated, self-sufficient environment for its workers and
residents. One critic called the earlier plans for Battery
Park City, "lonesome . . .'pods' of buildings sealed off in
fact and in spirit from neighboring Manhattan."37 Cooper
explained his redesign of Battery Park City:
Battery Park City as it was originally conceived was
an overbearing, unintelligible megastructure. . .
[With our redesign], we were determined to learn
from what had gone before, to make it less eccentric
and more familiar. . .We made every design
decisgn to make it more like New York rather than
less.
Cooper brought much of his vision for Battery Park City
to bear on his design for Cityfront Center. Both projects
make extensive use of a waterfront esplanade. As in New York,
the new streets in Cityfront Center are an extension of the
city's existing, well-defined grid system. Cooper's land use
plan for Cityfront Center extends the successful retail and
commercial district at Michigan Avenue east to a natural
juncture at Columbus Drive. The area east of Columbus Drive
to the lake is a logical extension of the residential
Streeterville area which stretches along the lakeshore to the
north. Mike Pepper, the project manager, explained, "We're
not creating anything new, [but looking to) see how people
solved problems before."
OPEN SPACES
Alexander Cooper "is something of a heretic. He thinks,
for instance, that building design is of secondary importance
to how the public spaces in a city are arranged."39 Cooper
starts with a master plan for parks and open spaces and then
considers the placement and intended uses of the buildings, an
idea counter-intuitive to many planners and developers. "It's
the spaces that endure over time in cities and that create the
identity, the addresses, and the value. The buildings will
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come and go."40 Central Park in New York, Grant Park in
Chicago, Palisades Park in Santa Monica, and the Public
Gardens and river esplanade in Boston are examples of this
concept at work.
Cooper's design for Chicago's Cityfront Center was to
cluster the open spaces into a few, distinctive "places"
rather than disperse them over the entire 61 acres as tiny
open spaces. "The term 'vest pocket parks' as created in the
past [on each individual parcel to obtain a higher FAR] is
being generous."41  Commissioner Hollander contrasts
Cooper's plan to the Harris Bank Building Plaza in Chicago, a
tiny windswept area whose fountain bathes pedestrians and
is a "totally functionless space."
On a site visit, Cooper took note of the impressive view
corridor from Lake Michigan across the site to the Tribune and
Wrigley Buildings on Michigan Avenue. The Ogden Slip picks up
the reflection of the Tribune Building in its waters, similar
to the reflecting pool at the base of the Washington Monument
in Washington, D.C. This became an important site feature for
Cooper and the city as well. The building massing of his
master plan calls for the retention of that view corridor and
the design of the new NBC Tower ingeniously allows for that.
NBC needed a 60,000 square foot footprint for its studios, a
difficult request for a downtown office building. By
designing a three-story building with a 60,000 square foot
footprint and then creating a tower which rises from only a
portion of that footprint, the view was preserved and all
parties involved were satisfied.
FLEXIBILITY AND COMMITMENT OF DEVELOPERS
The buildout of Cityfront Center is expected to take
twenty years. Because market conditions will change over that
period of time, as it has with Illinois Center, the developers
wanted flexibility among the square footage and types of
permitted uses for each building. The city and community
groups wanted assurances that the impacts of such a
large-scale use would be resolved and that public amentities
would be provided as promised. "This tension between the need
for flexibility from the private sector and the need for
resolution from the public sector is perhaps the central
design challenge for large-scale projects." 4 2
So how do you successfully develop a 60-acre parcel with
little dissention? In the opinion of Planning Commissioner
Hollander, it takes "a real commitment to planning by the
owners." Cooper's response to the inherent tension between
the public and private sectors was to "deal with issues the
public cares about, showing that the developer and designer
understand the place and the polity and are willing to balance
profit with public interest." 43  "We identify with the values
of both the private and governmental developers, and this
makes accommodation possible."4 4
The issue of common goals among the city, the public, and
the CDEV was heightened as the CDEV's land holdings were so
large. The joint venture's "interests do merge with those of
the city. . .An individual owner just wants to maximize the
value of his site. With CDEV, each building that's a success
improves the value of the rest of the land." 45 Another
significant benefit of Cityfront Center being held under
single ownership is that it allowed for a comprehensive master
plan to be designed, the plan's costs to be assessed, and a
means for future implementation to be devised. It is more
difficult to assign and collect an assessment for public
amenities when multiple owners are involved.
The joint venture addressed the issue of its commitment
to public improvements by first meeting and then exceeding the
requirements of the Lakefront Protection Ordinance with regard
to the width of the mandated public walkway along the river
and the number of points of public access to the waterfront
along the eastern half of the site. The same principles of
public access were voluntarily carried to the western portion
of the site where the Lakefront Protection Ordinance is not in
effect. Also, a sizable portion of the promised public
improvements are being installed even before buildings are
constructed and ready for occupancy.
Equitable is currently constructing approximately half of
Cityfront Plaza, a gathering place for a group of future
office buildings. (The remainder is to be completed after the
Mandel building is torn down.) The Dock and Canal Trust is
now completing approximately $10 million dollars in
infrastructure improvements, including the extension of
McClurg Court and other streets and a portion of the first
phase of the public riverfront improvements. The Trust is
working with the Muncipal Sanitary District to construct a
fountain at the juncture of McClurg Court and the river to
commemorate the 100th anniversary of that organization,
founded to redirect the flow of the Chicago River from Lake
Michigan and protect the city's water supply. After
residential development is underway, a park site at the
juncture of Lake Michigan and the Chicago River (Point Du
Sable Park) will also be improved and dedicated to the Chicago
Parks Department. Obviously these improvements enhance the
marketability of the project, but in addition the
"improvements to the site by [Dock and Canal and Equitable)
will benefit the public for years to come." 46
PHASING
Due to the size and scope of Cityfront Center,
development will take place over twenty years or more and
buildout will be phased. Each phase must be able to stand
alone as a complete, liveable, and marketable entity 'in and of
itself. This strategy insulates any single stage and the
project as a whole from later changes in the market. At
Cityfront Center, this has been accomplished through separate
commercial areas and small residential neighbhorhoods.
The second consideration in phasing is the need to match
construction costs with available cash flows. Creating an
elegant "address" cannot insure the success of a project if
expenses are not kept in line. This is particularly true of
early upfront costs required before the receipt of revenues to
offset them. The projection of tremendous upfront expenses
were a part of what befell the early plans for Battery Park
City. However, the city and community groups were interested
in seeing that public improvements are made early in the
project's phasing thus avoiding situations like Illinois
Center where the amenities are never provided or are
continuously delayed.
The Cityfront Center developers and the city planners had
these issues in mind when they devised a schedule requiring
improvements to Cityfront's riverfront esplanade and Du Sable
Park (at the southeastern tip of the project) to be made in
stages as buildout of the development progresses. Simply
stated, the development guidelines established a schedule that
sets "trigger levels" for public improvements. As development
progresses to these levels, implementation of the public
amenities begins. In this manner both the public and the
developer benefit. Community groups and city planners are
assured the public improvements will be made while the
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developers are not saddled with huge initial costs.
NEGOTIATION STRATEGY
The City of Chicago was zoned under a comprehensive
zoning ordinance in 1958. Although Chicago is known as the
home of the skyscraper, in the late 1950's, it was slowly
coming out of a twenty year slump in which no new highrises
had been built. The city wanted to promote downtown
development and, as a result, zoned most of the downtown area
with a generous floor area ratio of sixteen.4 When
the CDEV applied for a PD to redevelop the Dock and Canal
area, the as-of-right zoning for the Cityfront Center site
allowed up to 55 million square feet of office and residential
space. Early proposals drawn up by Skidmore, Owings and
Merrill (SOM) called for a total density of 30 million square
feet. The CDEV development team knew these markets could not
support this much new space. Nonetheless, many developers
would have approached the city with a request for more FAR
than they needed in order to use it as a concession point
during negotiations. The Cityfront developers, however,
adopted a strategy of "reasoned FAR" and did not ask the city
for more FAR than they wanted. The result is a site
considerably less dense than Illinois Center. "Similar
planning [to Illinois Center] would have been inappropriate to
the [Cityfront Center] site. There were clear signals for
less FAR than Illinois Center."48
The developers looked instead to designing an area that
"worked, one that offered mixed-uses and relief from density.
In this case, the team felt that "less was more." "We did
what we thought was right here. I don't believe [false
demands] are the way to approach municipalities."4 9 Mike
Pepper, the project manager, believes this strategy worked to
their advantage, "We weren't the [type of] developers out
there asking for more square footage."
INFRASTRUCTURE
An area where the joint venture saw value in making
concessions was regarding the considerable infrastructure
needed to make the site viable. The improvements included
streets (some elevated as much as thirty-five feet above grade
and, therefore, much more expensive), sidewalks, and a sewer
system connecting directly to the Municipal Sanitary
District's lines. The developers had approached the city with
a plan similar to tax increment financing where the
incremental tax revenues from the development would finance
the bond payments. The joint venture would make the bond
payments in the early years until the development generated
the tax revenues to cover the debt on the bonds. The public,
as heard through the civic interest groups and newspaper
editorials voiced its concerns on this issue, concerns that
the bonds would syphon needed tax revenues from school and
Municipal Sanitary District projects needed elsewhere in the
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city.
The joint venture did eventually "bite the bullet" and
"accept the inevitable, but we did it on our own terms."5 0
While CDEV accepted their need to pay for the improvements,
they also insisted the city accept the developers' need to do
the work privately (per city specifications). This was
important to the developers as they felt they could do the
work far less expensively and in a more timely manner than was
possible through the public bidding and contracting process.
(Timing also worked in favor of the joint venture as interest
rates were falling and it was possible to obtain private
financing for the first phase of the infrastructure at rates
similar to the proposed public bond financing.) The tradeoff
for privately funding the infrastructure expense was that it
allowed them to be cost efficient and to move ahead without
waiting on city bond financing which may or may not have been
available in each year it was needed. By agreeing to
privately finance the infrastructure improvements, the
developers also helped to remove the project from any negative
political changes in the City Council or Chicago political
climate. (Assuming a twenty year buildout, there will be five
Mayoral elections and ten City Council elections.)
The joint venture created a final strategy, worthy of
closer review. This is CDEV's plan for internal design
guidelines which will work in conjuction to the guidelines set
forth by the City of Chicago and is discussed further in
Chapter Five.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE DESIGN AND APPROVALS PROCESS
THE MASTER PLAN
In order to design a master plan for Cityfront Center,
Cooper and his planners set out to understand the joint
venturers' program, the physical site itself with its
opportunities and constraints, and the important issues the
plan would need to address. The planners did what any good
urban designers would do to begin the master planning of a
parcel of land. They studied the site itself and the context
in which the site was located. They studied the areas of
Illinois Center which had not "weathered" well over the twenty
years since it was designed. The team also met with city
engineers to understand traffic and infrastructure issues. 51
Once they had a clear grasp of the CDEV site, the planners
began meeting with the Planning Department which was just
beginning to consider comprehensive planning for the area in
which Cityfront Center was located.
Cooper visited the site with Planning Commissioner
Hollander and City Planner Bill Martin. During this site
tour, the group discussed the issues which would be important
to the city, including the treatment of the lakefront and
river edge, water circulation in the Ogden Slip, and the
potential syphoning of retail trade from the Michigan Avenue
retail area away to Cityfront Center. Cooper also pointed out
several issues which should be important to the city, such as
the view corridor from the Ogden Slip to the Tribune and
Wrigley Buildings. Through this investigative process, Cooper
established the necessary ground work from which to create his
plan.52
After this initial investigation, Cooper began a
three-step analysis which he feels is important for any large
development.53 Cooper used his preliminary findings to
establish "design principles" or broad goals for the site.
These concepts included estimates of overall density and type,
general location, and square footage of each use within the
site (ie. commercial, retail, hotel, and residential). From
these design principles, the planners developed a number of
"options" for the various areas within the site. These
conceptual plans studied the placement of streets and public
spaces and the development of individual land parcels within
the entire site. The idea was to study the conceptual plans
to determine which options could be accommodated in an overall
program. Cooper and the developers decided upon the best
options for each parcel. These were combined into an overall
master plan which was presented to the city as the basis for
approval of the residential and commercial plan for
development.
46
COOPER'S EXPERTISE
What made Cooper's plan special and unique? City
planners, community groups, and the joint venture team have
all commented on the wisdom of Cooper's plan to aggregate the
public amenities and focus the buildings around them rather
than having tiny, "postage stamp" open spaces at each building
within the development. Amy Hecker applauds Cooper's
treatment of Ogden Slip as an amenity and the human scale to
which he has designed the buildings surrounding it. The
riverwalk was given more attention and focus than any other
development along the Chicago River.
The Cityfront Center site had many natural amenities
(primarily the water features) with which to work but the site
was severely hampered by the infrastructure which "towered"
over it on its east and west boundaries. Earlier plans for
Cityfront Center had simply continued the elevated
infrastructure established by Michigan Avenue and Lake Shore
Drive across the entire site. The cost of the infrastructure
would have been prohibitive and in addition Cooper felt that
the residential areas especially should be at ground and
waterfront level. David Tinkham was particularly impressed by
Cooper's treatment of the eastern portion of the site. His
placement and design of Columbus Park allows for the
substantial grade level change from the elevated area east of
Columbus Drive to the natural grade level west of Columbus
Drive. Cooper's skill appears to lie in his ability to weave
his design into the fabric of an existing neighborhood and
to also deal with the opportunities and limitations of a
particular site.
DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES
At the time the developers presented the master plan to
the planning department, the city planners had been
concentrating their efforts on the Near North downtown area
with the expectation that new development would occur there
next. As a result, the Cityfront Center area, further to the
north and east and away from the central business district,
had not yet been carefully studied by the city planners.
Nonetheless, as mentioned in Chapter Two, the city planners
insisted on the creation of public guidelines for Cityfront
Center before they would allow the joint venture to apply for
a Plan for Development (PD).
Development guidelines had been established for earlier
Chicago projects (including Illinois Center), but they spoke
only to the broad issues of general land use and overall
density. The approval of Cityfront Center came at a time when
the planning department of Chicago, together with planning
departments in other U.S. cities, began to redefine its venue
to include urban design and the issues of open space, public
sector improvements, environmental impact, phasing,
infrastructure, and transportation.54 The city's goal was to
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establish development guidelines to "ensure that the public
interest is protected in any development large enough to
affect the adjacent community."55 These guidelines put future
Cityfront City developers on notice with regard to those
issues which were important to the city.
Development guidelines were an important issue on the
agenda of Elizabeth Hollander, the Commissioner of Planning
and Neighborhood Development, who had been recently appointed
by Mayor Washington. This, coupled with the planning
department's move to direct the urban design of new projects,
resulted in the creation of precedent-setting guidelines for
the Chicago Dock-Equitable Venture. Its guidelines are much
more detailed and broader in scope than anything previously
drafted and are important for a number of reasons.
Chicago has a number of large parcels which are held by
single owners and, due to growth in the areas, will soon be
ready for redevelopment. Notably, the American Medical
Association (AMA) owns a tract located just to the northwest
of Cityfront Center across Michigan Avenue. Since the 1800's,
Chicago has been a major Midwestern railway hub for
agricultural and industrial goods. Due to the decline in this
mode of transportation, Chicago has a number of large parcels
of land held by railroad companies which will soon be ready
for redevelopment. Cityfront Center, also held under a single
partnership at the time of its approvals, sets a precedent for
the establishment of design controls on these land parcels.
The City of Chicago is making a strategic effort to
address important land use and urban design issues in the
developing areas surrounding the Central Business District and
in the densely-developed areas along the lakefront. The
guidelines for Cityfront Center "set the precedent" for a part
of this effort, the shaping the River North Urban Design Plan,
"the City's first attempt to establish design guidelines for
an existing community with diverse ownership patterns."5 6 The
River North Plan, in turn, will be used as a model for other
Central Area plans including those for the West Loop, the
South Loop and the Central Business District. With guidelines
in place, developers within these areas will know what is be
expected of them, the review and approval processes can be
expedited, and development delays can be kept to a minimum.
While objective development standards provide a framework
for new projects and provide the community with assurances of
quality and products to be developed, it is important to keep
the guidelines flexible enough to allow for changes in
architectural styles, technology, and market forces. "Even
the word, 'guidelines,' suggests flexibility."57 It is for
this reason that the Chicago City Council does not approve
development guidelines. The approval of the City Council
would give the guidelines the force of law and would require
that they be amended to adjust for any changes market forces
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would require. The amendment process through the City Council
would be too difficult and open up the entire project for
renegotiation. (This may explain why a number of community
groups would like to see area guidelines subject to Council
approval.) "Council approval is so laborious, you want to
keep it out of that realm."58
RESPONSE OF CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS
The development guidelines for Cityfront Center, first
issued in late 1984, offered the public an important
opportunity to be heard. "It is extremely important to get
feedback from the people. Some ideas are crazy as hell, [yet]
some are valid."59 Public response in Chicago is heard most
often through a number of well-established, well-organized,
and well-respected civic interest groups. As Phil Levine,
Director of Planning for the City of Chicago explains, these
groups are made up of "a hard core group of civic-minded
individuals concerned with the downtown and its development.
They [help] keep us in balance." Some of these groups
consider their role to be that of "watchdogs," always mindful
of the potential for "public vandalism by public officials," 6 0
while others see themselves as civic advocacy groups with
tempered, balanced goals, reflecting the varied interests of
their constituents.61 A common theme in the formation of all
the community groups is a desire "to have some chance to have
influence" on decisions made by local and state governments.
While Cooper's plan was often described as "sensitive" to
its surrounding area, no plan can be expected to completely
satisfy everyone. Several groups, such as Friends of Downtown
and Friends of the Parks, felt as though CDEV should have been
even more aware of the surrounding communities and should have
solicited comments from interested groups even earlier in the
planning process. The joint venture "didn't bring the [civic]
groups in at the outset and say, 'We have sixty acres, what
percentage of open space should there be? Where should the
parks be located?"'62 Others felt the CDEV developers
"understood how to fit a large development into its
surrounding context,"63 and were more realistic in the extent
to which they could influence developers' plans. Each group
had objectives which were critical to them, but most groups
were moderate in their demands. "It's only in rare cases
where you have the luxury of going in and setting a vision and
having someone else live up to it." 64 Without the civic
interest groups having anything personally at stake, "there's
also the question of what's appropriate for the interest
groups to be demanding."65
The development team feels they were diligent in
soliciting and responding to the concerns of the interest
groups. The guideline and PD review processes also gave the
interest groups the opportunity to review and comment on the
developers' plans. In the words of Amy Hecker, working with
the community is the "only smart thing to do because one must
assume that this [project] is pretty complex and there will be
disagreements. Why wait until the last minute? It [affects]
the timing and antagonizes people." Jack Guthman, the
venture's zoning counsel, commented, "We drive carefully. You
don't have to run people over with a train. . .We want
people to feel included. It's the right way to get the
project done." Mitch Kardon of the Metropolitan Planning
Council agreed, "I've got to give [Guthman] credit for trying
to work with us."
In general, most of the community groups felt the CDEV
master plan had merit. The concerns the community groups did
have focused on a number of transportation and public amentity
issues. A discussion of these issues follows:
A. Access to Cityfront Center from Michigan Avenue through
Pioneer Court
In order to provide access to Cityfront Center from
Michigan Avenue, Cooper's design called for the project's main
entrance to be located through Pioneer Court, a bustling,
well-known pedestrian plaza just north of the Chicago River
between the Equitable and Tribune buildings. Many of
Chicago's interest groups felt a roadway through Pioneer Court
would "diminish the whole urban area - one of the world's
greatest - and break the now unbroken and famous promenade
from the south side of the Michigan Avenue bridge to Ohio
Street."66 The city planners and interest groups were also
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concerned over the additional traffic which would be generated
at this already heavily congested location across the street
from the Wrigley Building.
City planners were also sensitive in looking to the
future and the additional traffic which will be created by the
eventual development of the American Medical Associations's
land to the west of Michigan Avenue. Illinois Street, an
existing road to the north of the site, is a natural access
point from the AMA site and, if Cityfront Center could be
reached from this same street, it would be possible to create
and signalize a major four-way intersection, allowing traffic
to flow efficiently. (Traffic would be slowed significantly
if a "jog" in the road from Illinois Street to Pioneer Court
were necessary.)
The developers conceded to provide access to automobiles
via Illinois Street, an existing road to the north of the
site. This will not be as visible a main entrance to
Cityfront Center as would be access from bustling Michigan
Avenue, but traffic snarls will be reduced and the project
will still have a ceremonial entrance through Pioneer Court.
The joint venture's concession was due partially to
difficulties in obtaining the necessary easements from the
Tribune Company. The Chicago Dock - Equitable Venture and the
Tribune Company share the easement over the street on which
Pioneer Court is located. This gave the Tribune considerable
leverage over the CDEV and made access through Pioneer Court
too expensive a proposition. Access from Illinois Street
became the preferable alternative for both the Cityfront
developers and the public.
B. Funding for Infrastructure Improvements.
Tishman Speyer Properties, the master developers of
Cityfront Center, wanted the city to share in the cost of road
and walkway improvements on the CDEV site. In a proposal
similar to tax increment financing, the developers would pay
back the bonds and the interest in the early years of the
project, but as commercial and residential space was added to
the tax rolls, the burden of repayment would shift to the
city.
This was a highly controversial issue. The city and
community groups were concerned that the money needed for
Cityfront Center's infrastructure financing would divert funds
from the overburdened school system. At the time, the
Municipal Sanitary District, which was in the midst of
extensive capital improvements to reduce flooding in the city,
was also in need of tax dollars. What little infrastructure
funds were available were tagged to go to the outlying
neighborhoods first.67 Mary Decker, executive director of the
Metropolitan Planning Council, an organization dedicated to
"initiating and promoting comprehensive programs and policies
that help [the Chicago region] cope with . . .growth and
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change" (MPC Brochure), outlined her organization's stance:
Our position as far as leveraging infrastructure is
concerned is that the city should do it to cause
development to occur in areas where it wouldn't
naturally occur. But the . . neighborhood
couldn't be more ripe for development, ang8therefore
the city's involvement should be limited.
In Planning Commissioner Hollander's words, "We cannot afford
to mortgage the future tax base of the city."69 The city
made it clear to the developers that the approval of Cityfront
Center was contingent upon private financing of the
infrastructure.
The joint venture had always known this was a possibility
and so had added the infrastructure costs to their worst case
financial scenarios. (If the work were done privately, the
joint venture would at least not have to worry that the city
would not have bond funds available when Cityfront Center's
infrastructure was needed.) However, if the partnership was
to pay for the infrastructure, CDEV insisted that they do the
work themselves. Tishman, Speyer properties, the master
developer, estimated the cost would near $150 million if the
city were to do the work and the partnership were to pay for
its cost, double what it was estimated to cost to handle the
construction privately. The higher expected cost was due to
union contracts and the interest carry for the longer time
period the city would require to do the work. Private
financing also ended the issue of timing and overseeing work
over which the developers would have no control, a cost to
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which it is difficult to assess a monetary value. The
partnership was aided by the fact that interest rates were
beginning to fall. This reduced the gap between the
preferential rates on public bond financing and the rates the
joint venture could secure through private financing and
lowered the overall infrastructure expense.
C. The Treatment of Ogden Slip.
For aesthetic reasons and to increase the circulation of
the water within Ogden Slip, the city was interested in the
extension of the Slip south to the river through the addition
of a north-south channel. As one member of the development
team put it, "The site is already on a peninsula, how much
more water do we need to bring to it?" City Planner Bill
Martin, in fact, wanted to see the creation of an "island."
From his viewpoint, Ogden Slip, as it stands now, is a . . .
stagnant body of water. Junk is pushed in and
trapped at the end of the slip when the locks from
the lake are opened. Connecting the slip [to the
river) would have created natural circulation of the
water.
The extension of the slip would have been costly and would
have also required bridges to tie the "island" to the
rest of the site. The issue was not critical to other
city planners and studies showed that a mechanical system
would make it possible to circulate water within the slip
so the CDEV was not required to extend the slip south to the
river.
Chicago architect Harry Weese also wanted to see the slip
designated a national historic landmark. In the opinion of
Weese, "It's part of the original plan of the city, and has
historical connotations."70 An historic designation might
have limited the joint venture's plans to backfill the third
of the slip that lies to the west of Columbus Drive had the
joint venture applied for any federal funds with which to do
the work. Filling the slip to the east of Columbus Drive made
Cooper's land plan more workable, eliminated the need for
costly bridges, and increased the amount of developable land
on the site.
Weese had been successful in designating as historic
landmarks the city's Orchestra Hall, the elevated train tracks
in the downtown "loop," and Soldiers Field. He ran into major
roadblocks on the designation of Ogden Slip for at least two
reasons: (1) no property can be placed on the national
register over the objections of the owner according to a 1981
revison in the landmarks law and (2) all landmarks placed on
the national register must be tied to structures, therefore
bodies of water cannot be designated. As a result, Ogden Slip
was not declared a landmark and the western portion of the
Slip has been filled.
D. The Upfront Planning of du Sable Park.
Du Sable Park, on the eastern edge of the site at the
lake, will be the last public open space to be developed in
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Cityfront Center. Nevertheless, the Metropolitan Planning
Council, Open Lands Project, and Friends of the Park wanted
the programming and plans for the park to be finalized at the
time the PD was approved. In Jack Guthman's opinion, "There
is not a willingness to accept the corporate response, no
trust (on the part of the public)." With the uncertainties of
all that will occur over the next twenty years of build-out,
the development team felt that it was not practical to
tie-down the park's design so far in advance of its
completion. The development team felt strongly that it was
not wise to commit to a specific design at the present time
and thus planning for the design of the park has been left for
the future when it can more responsibly meet the needs of the
public.
E. Traffic and Parking.
Bill Martin, planner with the City of Chicago at the time
and now with the Chicago Central Area Committee, explained
that the 13,000 parking spaces required (per existing
ordinances) would have been the equivalent of four levels of
parking across all 40 developable acres. (The high water
table and inherent problems in soil composition make
underground parking structures extremely expensive and
difficult to build.) In lowering the parking requirements for
Cityfront Center, Martin felt the city was responsive not only
to the need of making the development feasible but in allowing
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the architects to design to a "human scale" without a wall of
parking rising fifty feet above grade from the base of each
building.
Nonetheless, the Metropolitan Planning Council felt a
transit plan should be made a part of the developer's first
annual progress report. "The development will add the
equivalent of four Sears Towers in building space. . . and
may so increase the demand on public transportation that major
alterations in the system may be needed."71 Although this was
not made a requirement in the approved PD, the joint venture
did dedicate easements to allow for a future light rail
"distributor" system to run from the commuter train stations
through the site and on to Navy Pier.
F. Phasing and Ongoing Accountability
Cooper's plan calls for a continuous public
esplanade/walkway along the Chicago River, a long-time goal of
citizens' groups. A primary concern to the Metropolitan
Planning Council, however, was the fact that the original
development guidelines for the site recommended, but did not
require, the joint venture to follow the city's
recommendations for the timing of the riverfront improvements
and the installation of other public open spaces. The revised
guidelines do require that the riverfront be improved in
phases which are tied to the build-out of the project. The
riverwalk is to begin at the western boundary of the site
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(where NBC Tower is currently being completed) and continue to
the east as development progesses along this axis. The group
was unsuccessful in seeing that the timing of Du Sable Park,
as a part of the riverfront improvements, be accelerated.
There are still members of the community groups and
architectural critics who judge Cooper's public spaces to be
too programmed and without enough open, green spaces. In
addition, the complaint that is still most often made of
Cityfront's plan for open space is that the remaining
pedestrian ways through the project are not clearly delineated
and that the other public parks within the plan are not on
timetables similar to that of the riverfront. The civic
groups were unsuccessful in affecting any significant changes
on these issues. Chicago Dock and Canal and Equitable are to
be held accountable for compliance with the controls that were
established. On an annual basis for the first five years, and
thereafter as required by the Planning Commissioner, the
owners of Cityfront Center are required to submit a report
identifying the work undertaken as required in the Plan for
Development.
The precedent-setting development guidelines for
Cityfront Center were approved by the Planning Commission in
April, 1985. The major issues regarding Cityfront's Plan for
Development had been "hammered out" during review by the city
planning department and the civic interest groups. As a
result, the Plan was unanimously approved by the Chicago Plan
Commission in August, 1985 and forwarded to the the Chicago
City Council for its approval. The Planned Development
Ordinance (PD), controlling the CDEV's site of over 60 acres,
was approved by the City Council in November, 1985, just
eighteen months from the time the project's master plan was
first presented to the City Planning Department. In the words
of Elizabeth Hollander, "The groups came to a remarkable
amount of concensus on a large parcel in a short amount of
time."
CHAPTER FIVE
INTERNAL DESIGN GUIDELINES
Presently, Cooper's master plan is only that, a plan, an
outline, an intention. Yet, "Cooper wants to see his plan
survive such that he can come back twenty-five years from now
and know what the development will look like."72 Developers
want plans upon which they can rely. Careful control and
implementation will be necessary for Cooper's design to become
a reality. Therefore, it was in both CDEV's and the city's
best interest to establish control mechanisms such that, over
a period of time, the various developers involved with the
project would maintain the integrity of the master plan and
create what CDEV and the city intended for the site.
The issues of long-term control and predictability are
reasons the city has been interested in establishing
development guidelines to govern all large areas of
redevelopment. The Chicago Dock-Equitable joint venture has
also established internal design standards as required by its
PD. These standards exceed those of the city and organize a
"framework for the continuing development of Cityfront Center,
. . .while permitting each user or developer to express his
own identity and meet his own objectives within the broader
context."73
The developers recognized the inherent conflict in
long-term planning: the need to be able to predict and rely
upon established plans and guidelines and yet still be
flexible to allow for changes in the marketplace. Therefore,
the internal standards for Cityfront Center are not overly
detailed; they speak primarily to maintaining a prescribed
level of quality and are more general when dealing with issues
of design. "It's yet to be seen whether we've left enough
flexibility. However, you can build an incredible range of
buildings and still be within the guidelines." 7 4
The internal design standards are organized into two
sections. Section I has been reviewed and approved by the
Chicago Department of Planning and applies to open space
amenities, infrastructure and vehicular and pedestrian
circulation systems. Section I has been developed jointly by
the Dock and Canal Trust and Equitable and will be used on all
the land associated with the PD. In comparison, with Illinois
Center, "the city had no assurance of what would be built or
even that it would be built; the [general parameters
established in the] PD were the only assurances the city had
of what the plan would be." 75
The Section II standards have been drawn up separately by
the Trust and Equitable for the areas they individually own,
and although their standards are similar, they are not
identical. (The differences are due primarily to the fact
that Equitable's tracts are commercial while the Trust's
parcels are primarily residential.) The Section II standards
have been reviewed by the city's planning department but their
approval is not required. Nevertheless, technically a project
is not to be submitted to the city for building permits until
a proposed project is in compliance with the internal
standards.
Section II specifically speaks to the development of any
individual parcel and is "intended to establish a
self-policing structure for the evaluation of projects which
shall be brought to [the owners] for review and approval."
Section II outlines the form, materials, color lighting,
signage, and landscaping of all buildings. The buildings are
to be "in keeping with the long-established Chicago tradition"
of tripartite division (distinctive buildings bases, shafts,
and tops), natural stone, brick or pre-cast concrete, and
naturally occurring colors. Buildings with facades
predominantly of glass are discouraged and 40% limit on glass
on the bases of the buildings. The result is the
establishment of private guidelines similar to those a more
strict city planning department might impose on a development.
Cooper, Eckstut Associates designed a similar set of
guidelines for Battery Park City which have proved to very
important to the success of that project. "Because the
materials and the forms are drawn from familiar sources, the
buildings exude an almost palpable feeling of welcome."7 6
Ulrich Franzen, the designer of a residential project at
Battery Park City explained, "The guidelines became the
surrogate for a context. They created a level of sensitive
design probably not otherwise available." Donald Trump,
concerned over gaining city approval of his project and
impressed with the results of Battery Park City, hired
Alexander Cooper to replace Helmut Jahn, designer of the
"shiny and new," for the development of Trump's Television
City on Manhattan's Upper West Side.7 8
Although Equitable and the Dock and Canal Trust have
designed internal standards, the true test will come in their
implementation of those standards over time. Alex Cooper
described the Battery Park City Authority, the overseeing
authority for the project, as "brutally diligent" in order to
achieve success through the use of their guidelines. Cesar
Pelli, designer of Battery Park City's World Financial Center
added, "The execution is the part of a project where things
come unraveled. This is where you have to make the deals and
the compromises."7 9 Battles over the size and color of brick
were so frequent that the Authority's staff joked about who
was winning the "brick wars."80 The difficulty is in
maintaining the standards, even through difficult economic
times. Amanda Burden, vice-president for planning and design
at the Authority, described the dilemma,
If any one developer had got a break, all the
others would have been compromised. One reason they
wanted to be here was that they'd be protected from
somebogy doing a worse building down the
block.
Battery Park City's Gateway Towers are stark concrete,
prison-like structures built in the 1970's during New York's
economically difficult times and before Cooper's guidelines
were created for the project. The appearance of Gateway
Towers in many ways prompted Cooper's guidelines which now
direct the design within Battery Park City. Gateway Towers
stand in sharp contrast to the rest of Battery Park City and
are startling examples of what might have occurred over the
rest of the development had design guidelines not been
established and enforced. Another example of what might have
happened is the Times Square redevelopment plan which Cooper
helped to design. Since then, the plan has been "stripped" of
some of the key architectural-design guidelines opening the
way for compromises which may result in the approval of
buildings of marginal design.
A primary concern for any potential developers will be
the cost of implementing the internal design standards set for
Cityfront Center. "It's fair to say that it will cost a
little more to deal with the articulated bases and tops we're
calling for."82 The design "extras" at Battery Park City
added approximately ten percent to the buildings' total cost,
according to Ellen Rosen, spokeswoman for the Authority.83
The owners argue that while a building may cost more to be in
compliance with the guidelines, more value is created in each
building because each building is better built and surrounded
by buildings of equal quality. The argument continues that
these buildings will command higher rents and in the long-term
have greater value. Despite this potential for improved
value, the owners of Cityfront Center will need to be
conscious of potential "cost cutting" by developers to
compensate for the added requirements that the internal design
guidelines will cost. Narrow hallways and small apartments at
Battery Park City attest to the fact that, "by putting more
money into the skins of the buildings, the developers cut
corners on the interiors."84
The authority to enforce the design guidelines is the
key. In Cooper's opinion, "Without an organization like [the
Battery Park City Authority], guidelines are of questionable
value."8 5 Approval and rejection of plans for buildings
within Cityfront Center will need to be firm, fair, and
responsive and should be handled by a staff qualified in
design review. Adherence to the Section II standards is not
required by the City of Chicago Planning Department in the
same way that adherence to the Section I standards is made a
requirement. (Section I standards deal with public interest
and safety issues such as open space and infrastructure
standards.) This gives Equitable and the Dock and Canal Trust
a measure of flexibility in their approvals. On the flip
side, the owners cannot necessarily look to the city for
"strong arm" enforcement when developers want variances from
the internal standards but they must maintain their standards
on their own using their own "power." The city is in agreement
in principal with Equitable and the Trust and does not want to
issue building permits for any plans unacceptable to Equitable
and Dock and Canal. Nonetheless, it will be primarily up to
those entities to enforce their own Section II guidelines.
Equitable is establishing an aesthetic precedent for
future developments on their site with their completion of the
NBC Tower. "Dock and Canal will have the greater task of
requiring developers to meet the design standards" 86
as no precedent-setting buildings have yet been constructed on
their land. Battery Park City exemplifies the value of
adherence to established and respected design guidelines.
Time and the owners' willingness and ability to accept the
long-term nature of the project will determine whether or not
the same value is realized at Cityfront Center.
CHAPTER SIX
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
DESIGN AND APPROVALS PROCESS
The Chicago Dock - Equitable Venture obtained the
approval for the Cityfront Center master plan and plan for
development in only eighteen months from the time the master
plan was presented to the city for review. Not only were
approvals swift in comparison to that of many other cities,
but in the words of Mike Pepper, project manager for Cityfront
Center, "It's unbelievable that thirty buildings could be
zoned all at once in a sensitive area of Chicago." A study of
Cityfront Center and the approvals process of Chicago raises
a number of questions:
How would a public design of Cityfront Center
have differed from CDEV's private design of the
site?
Should city planning departments be involved in
urban design and architectural design review? If
so, at what stages and how deeply should they be
involved in the review process?
Is the design and approvals process established
at Cityfront Center transferable to other land
parcels in Chicago and to sites in other
metropolitan areas?
Why does it appear to be easier to develop in
Chicago than a number of other major U.S. cities?
Has the economy and architectural design of
Chicago suffered as a result?
This chapter will review the opinions of many of the
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Cityfront Center players and the conclusions which may be
drawn from the study of the design and approval process that
has resulted in the Cityfront Center development guidelines,
plan for development, and internal design standards.
PRIVATE PLANNING IN A PUBLIC ARENA
The development goals for a large parcel in a highly
visible and densely populated area of a major metropolitan
city are often determined by a city's planning and regulatory
agencies. In the ideal case, public objectives would be
established by the appropriate city regulatory agencies for a
politically and economically sensitive development site, such
as Cityfront Center. These goals would then be set forth in a
zoning ordinance specifically governing that parcel or parcels
of land. In contrast, the only regulations applicable to the
CDEV site were the Lakefront Protection Ordinance and the
city's original zoning ordinance established in 1958. In
1984, before the city planning department had had the
opportunity to closely review the area and establish
development guidelines, the Chicago Dock - Equitable Venture
was ready to begin its plans for developing the Cityfront
Center site.
As a result the CDEV joint venture, with the aid of the
Alexander Cooper design team, privately embarked on
establishing a master plan for the CDEV site--before
development guidelines were established by any public agency.
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One hypothesis that may be drawn is that private developers
would have had goals and objectives different from those of
public planning agencies and that as a result a private
planning process would have created a design much different
than one created by public planners.
It is surprising to note, then, that both city planners
and Cooper's team felt that the plan for Cityfront Center
would have been little changed if the city had been in charge
of its master plan. Both sides do agree that a public plan
devised by the city (and perhaps less sensitive to CDEV's
development costs) would have called for more open space, but
it is to be expected that a public agency will always ask for
more public amenities than a developer will offer.
Regardless, those interviewed in both the public and private
sectors agree that the actual plan is a good one
nonetheless.
A number of reasons were cited to explain how a private
plan could be successfully approved with only minimal changes.
During the design process, Alexander Cooper and his team
worked with the city to identify those issues that the public
planners felt were important to the city and the community.
Although Cooper dedicated the time and effort necessary to
create the design of the master plan, the city had input in
much the same way it would have had if the guidelines had been
drawn up by the city's planning department. Ed Smith,
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Executive Vice President of Equitable, explained the design
process, "With a piece of land so large and unique, it almost
has to be an evolving process. You start with ideas, then
talk with the city." He commented further that the city would
have had to use the same evolving process the developers had
used (ie. starting with ideas and then getting responses from
developers and interested citizens). In a vacuum, the city
could not have independently created guidelines for a given
area without looking at alternatives and considering the
private market. The city did exactly this in devising
the River North guidelines: the planning department solicited
responses to its first draft from the residents and businesses
in the neighborhood.
Beth White of the Friends of the River also commented
that, "Cityfront Center was a big enough site that everyone,
[the developers, the city, and the community groups], could
get something out of it." As discussed previously in Chapter
Three, the interests of the developers and the city merged in
many ways due to the long-term build-out of the project and
the joint venture's need to maximize the value of the entire
site.
PUBLIC DESIGN REVIEW
In recent years a number of cities have begun to review
the architectural design of projects--in addition to reviewing
engineering issues, density, and urban design. The most
notable of these cities are San Francisco and Boston, where in
the words of Brian Shea, "they even want to approve cornice
lines." San Francisco has gone to great lengths to set down
specific design guidelines in writing. The Boston
Redevelopment Authority (the BRA) is particularly powerful as
a specially enacted state statute gives it the power to act as
both the city's planning and development authorities for the
city. With its powers of condemnation and responsibility for
urban renewal, the BRA controls a great amount of land
and, from that land, makes $30 - $40 million each year in
leasing and permitting fees. Its charter is unlike
any other in the country; its considerable income supports
a sizeable staff who are given assignments to study urban
design issues, plan, and monitor the course of development in
Boston, and closely review development proposals. The BRA's
ability to generate substantial income has allowed it to
expand its activities more than any other similar planning
agency.
There appears to be a genuine commitment on the part of
planning staffs in the cities that review architectural design
that "good design" should happen in their cities. Many also
believe that Boston's complicated and very restrictive
approvals process has kept the city from becoming overbuilt.
Comments have been made that answering to the Boston
Redevelopment Authority (the BRA) can improve designs which
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may be cost effective but are inappropriate for the context in
which the building is to be constructed.
No project, with or without public review, is going to
satisfy the design preferences of all critics. Susan Allen,
past Assistant Director of the BRA, believes it is. . .
tough to say what [approval process] works. I
know examples where [design review] really works
but unfortunately it does not always work. A
compromise does not always make for a better
project.
(This statement seems to be borne out by the fact that recent
Boston projects are not known for the quality of their
architectural design despite stringent review.) One Boston
architect also noted that the BRA derives a great deal of
political and economic power from its detailed design review
process and that its procedures are "ineffective and
inefficient when the developer's risks and costs for approval
are so high." The approvals procedure is ad hoc and "the BRA
changes its mind all the time,. . . but to establish
development or design guidelines would mean the Authority
would lose some of its power."
The question arises as to how Boston and the BRA "get
away" with such detailed and demanding design review and the
stiff linkage fees which are required of most projects built
in Boston? Why do developers continue to queue up for
approvals in Boston? Many believe that Boston has a quality
of life that is unique, and that the city benefits from a
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great number of highly talented people involved in the
planning process. The most compelling reason, however, seems
to be the strong market which Boston has experienced over the
past ten years. "When the golden goose [the strong market] is
gone, the BRA will not be able to get all these concessions.
It is a great luxury to the BRA now."8 8
Ed Smith, with Equitable Real Estate, and Bill Martin,
with the Chicago Central Area Committee and past planner for
the City of Chicago, believe that cities like Boston and San
Francisco may have a short-sighted view. "Cities have to be
careful that the process doesn't become so difficult that it
is virtually impossible to develop there. Their processes
will have tremendous economic impacts." 8 9 Even in
strong markets, when rents begin to rise, tenants will begin
to look for alternative locations from which to lease space.
Smith commented on the results San Francisco is already
experiencing from their restrictive approvals process,
The focus in California has changed with regard to
the relative economic importance of San Francisco
and Los Angeles. A lot of that has to do with the
restrictive growth philosophy of San Francisco.
Ed Smith also thought that the competitive marketplace
was very effective in policing architectural design rather
than handing that power over to city planning departments who
are unfamiliar with the demands of the market. Developers are
highly attuned to the desires of their users and what is
appropriate for the market in their attempt to interest
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tenants in leasing their buildings. Smith explained,
I don't know what a city could add to [to the design
review) process to protect against a monstrocity of
a building. The most critiqued building in Chicago
is the State of Illinois Building where the state
had control over design but there were no market
constraints and the state did not have to design for
what was appropriate to the market.
Despite the criticism of the State of Illinois Building,
Martin applauds the diversity it and other buildings bring
to the archtitecture of Chicago. He is concerned that design
review by public agencies will result in a skyline of
identical buildings that reflect the taste of the city
officials in office at the time. "My main concern is that you
don't want everything Adrian [Smith] or Helmut [Jahn]."
An argument can be made for the creation of design review
committees to serve as a compromise between the absence of
public design review and complete power for architectural
review being held by city planning agencies. These committees
typically serve in an advisory capacity and are citizen-based
with professional planners and architects serving on them as
well. Careful attention must be taken to appoint qualified
persons and to establish a reasonable process with ground
rules for design approval. Otherwise the process can become
arbitrary and abusive; approval by the committee can become
yet another unspecified and undetermined hurdle a developer
must risk overcoming in order to gain approval for a project.
Another problem can be a city's unwillingness, for whatever
reason, to turn over design review to an outside committee. A
design review committee was ostenibly created several years
ago in Boston, although its ability to function has been
stymied politically. A Boston architect who wishes to remain
anonymous feels the BRA has been dragging its feet in defining
the role the design review committee is to play in the
approvals process because it would diminish the wide net of
power currently enjoyed by the BRA.
TRANSFERABILITY OF THE DESIGN AND APPROVALS PROCESSES
ESTABLISHED AT CITYFRONT CENTER
Cityfront Center is an interesting case study in
transferability of approval strategies and techniques.
Alexander Cooper and the development team made use of lessons
learned from earlier projects which were transferred to
Cityfront Center. Not only was Illinois Center studied to
determine which aspects of the project had not withstood the
tests of time, but Cooper was able to use his experience at
Battery Park City and other projects throughout the country to
improve the design of Cityfront Center. His experience in
other cities was valuable despite the fact he had never before
done a major project in Chicago. Just as the designers of
Cityfront Center had looked to previous projects to gain
insights for their development, the lessons learned during the
process of gaining of designing development guidelines for
Cityfront Center were in turn used in the design of guidelines
for other developing areas of Chicago.
As previously discussed in Chapter Four, Cityfront
Center's development guidelines (established by Chicago's
Planning Department) set a precedent for the planning of a
number of large land parcels in Chicago held under single
ownership, such as those held by the American Medical
Association and various railroad companies. The guidelines
for the development of Cityfront Center have also been
successfully tailored to fit the planning needs of the River
North area, although River North is an existing improved
neighborhood and business community with diverse ownership and
interests. In a continuing pattern, plans are underway for
the Cityfront Center and River North guidelines to be refined
and applied to planning other redeveloping areas near
downtown.
Bill Martin explains that, while each community is
different, there are always boilerplate urban design issues
that are applicable to every plan. This enables the
guidelines and procedures established at Cityfront Center to
be applied to other areas of Chicago. Having learned from
earlier planning experiences, the public planners took the
design of the River North guidelines a step further than they
took with the planning of Cityfront Center, much as the
developers of Cityfront Center applied lessons learned from
Illinois Center. (This was partially due to the diversity of
ownership in the River North area.) Eighteen hundred
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guideline workbooks were distributed within the River North
neighborhood in order to solicit comments from the residents
and businessmen in the area. The workbook was intended to
give people ideas to consider and an opportunity to express
their own views in a structured manner. After all, "people in
the neighborhoods know the problems better than the planners.
Planners would have to 'live' there day and night to
understand all the issues." 90 So successful was the
effort that the planners have found it difficult to hold on to
any remaining copies for their own use and the design of
future guidelines for other areas is expected to include
similar public review.
The guidelines for Cityfront Center have been
successfully applied to the planning of other redeveloping
areas in Chicago. Can the same be said of Cooper's master
plan for Cityfront Center? Cooper has been successful in
adapting his designs to varying environments such as Battery
Park City in New York, which was used as a prototype for the
design of Cityfront Center. Both projects aggregate open
public spaces, work to bring the development into the fabric
of the existing city surrounding them, and have
established internal design guidelines to govern the build-out
of individual sites and structures within the projects.
The design firm of Cooper, Robertson + Partners is
currently working on various projects in which its experience
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with Battery Park City and Cityfront Center will also be
useful. Its past projects include the Embarcadero Center in
San Francisco, the Times Square redevelopment in New York
City, and the ongoing redevelopment of Rockefeller Center also
in New York City. Current projects include Donald Trump's
Television City in New York City, a 750 acre foreign trade
zone in New Jersey, the expansion of several college campuses,
and a redevelopment plan for downtown Charlotte, North
Carolina. Most of these projects are owned or controlled by a
single business entity or public agency. In the case of
Cityfront Center, most of the land had also been previously
cleared for redevelopment; this gave Cooper a clean slate from
which to work (although existing infrastructure and grade
changes did limit his design opportunities). In the future,
the more difficult challenge to Cooper in designing master
plans will be the successful transfer of his ideas to projects
with ongoing residential and business communities, where
buildings already exist, the infrastructure is in place, and
many diversified owners hold the land.
THE CHICAGO APPROVALS PROCESS
The approvals process in Chicago appears less arduous and
time consuming than the processes established in a number of
other major cities. When asked how long it would take to get
a project similar to the 60-acre Cityfront Center approved in
Boston or San Francisco, Ed Smith replied that it may not be
possible at all. So why is it easier to get a development
approved in Chicago? A number of factors make up the answer
to this question.
The Great Chicago Fire of 1871 required that a great
portion of Chicago, including the entire downtown area, be
completely rebuilt. Since that time, the City of Chicago has
been pro-development. (It is interesting to note in contrast
that San Francisco had a similar earthquake and fire in 1906,
but currently has a reputation as one of the country's most
restrictive cities for new development.) The original
comprehensive zoning plan of 1958, allowing for an average FAR
of sixteen in the central business district, reinforced the
city's commitment to development. At the time of the zoning
plan, no new high rise buildings had been built since the
1930's and the lenient zoning was an inducement to attract new
development. Today the city is still pro-development and
competes with surrounding suburban areas for new projects
which will increase tax revenues and the number of jobs
available to its citizens.
As a result of the existing as-of-right zoning in
Chicago, a great deal of development can be done without a
developer having to apply for a zoning variance or a plan for
development (PD). Plans for development are usually only
required on projects greater than an acre in size. According
to Bill Martin, developers feel they have certain rights and
retain these rights, under their as-of-right zoning even when
they do come in for a zoning variance. With substantial
rights under their as-of-right zoning, it becomes more
difficult for the city to extract stiff concessions,
particularly regarding issues of density. As an example, if
CDEV had developed under its as-of-right zoning (ie.
developing the land parcel by parcel rather than under a
single PD), the site could have had 55 million square feet of
mixed use space built upon it.
Moreover, the process of submitting building plans to the
city makes it easier to develop in Chicago. A preliminary
submittal for a plan for development simply requires that the
developer identify the site and the total number of square
feet to be built. (No building designs are required at this
point.) Next, the land planners and architects work on a
variety of plans and conceptual drawings, but no additional
submissions of design or otherwise are required by the
planning department. As a result, the city planners do not
have a formal opportunity to make comments during the
conceptual drawings stage. The developers only come back to
the planning department for final approvals.
At this stage they come with full-blown models and plan
and are "almost to working drawings." At that point the
developer has committed a great deal of time and money in the
project. As mentioned earlier, the Chicago Planning
Department does not review the aesthetics of a proposed
development. Design review is a "scary issue in Chicago" and
there is a concern that it will halt new development.9 Phil
Levine, Director of Zoning for the City of Chicago, also
explained that there are limits on the city's authority
regarding design control. "If someone came in with an
absolutely horrible building, it would be hard for us to tell
them to go back to the drawing board." (This approvals
process stands in sharp contrast to that of the BRA which
reduced the height of the buildings to be built on the Fan
Piers by one-half, despite great investments of time and money
by the projects' developers.)
The approval of Cityfront Center set another precedent
through the creation of a working relationship between the
project's developers and the city planning department.
Although not required by zoning regulations, the developers of
Cityfront Center worked with the city planning department
throughout the conceptual design phase to successfully create
a development which satisfied both public and private demands.
Although the current approvals system in Chicago appears to be
working, the planning department and community interest groups
would like to improve the process and involve more developers
in ongoing dialogue during the conceptual phase of designing a
project.
Currently, the planning department can only informally
ask developers to bring their conceptual drawings in for
review. Although some developers, such as CDEV, have been
willing to work with the city on an ongoing basis throughout
the planning process, this informal review system is
experiencing only limited success. Therefore, the planning
department and civic groups are working to formalize the
review process by amending the long-standing zoning ordinance
to reflect an established process for review of plans and a
time schedule for that process.
Chicago has only recently begun drafting development
guidelines which address the treatment urban design issues.
Some community groups argue that city does not yet know what
it can extract from the developer. "The city pushed hard [on
Cityfront Center], but only by Chicago standards, not by
Boston or San Francisco standards." 92 In rebuttal, Ed Smith
of Equitable feels that by paying $75 million in
infrastructure expenses, Equitable and the Dock and Canal
Trust. . .
are paying the piper. The city's not paying for any
infrastructure at all and that doesn't come out in
the papers. . . Infrastructure is the
responsibility of a municipality. It benefits the
property we hold and the city as a whole. The city
made it clear that [private funding of the
infrastructure expense] was a condition of the
development going forward.
Accepting the assumption it is more difficult to develop
in a city that has a larger planning staff and with more time
to carefully review and critique each development proposal at
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least one community group has agreed that one reason it is
easier to develop in Chicago is that its planning department
is understaffed. As one civic leader explained, "Where
government operates better, interest groups don't exist." If
one were to look at the planning department staff in relation
to the population of the cities, Chicago (1: 9,250) would
compare unfavorably to Boston (1: 2,000) and San Francisco
(1:4,950).
Another way of viewing these statistics is to consider
that, because Chicago is more in favor of development
compared to these other cities, it does not need as large a
staff to review and "impede" development. In other words, the
smaller staff per capita does not so much allow more and
easier development to occur in Chicago, but it is instead the
result of a development stance adopted by the city many years
ago. (Note that, regardless of the conclusions drawn, these
statistics should be viewed with a very critical eye as cities
include varying departments under the heading of "planning"
and "development" and are therefore not necessarily
comparable.)
QUALITY OF CHICAGO DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE
Despite the seeming relative ease of gaining planning
approvals and the fact that there is no public architectural
review process, Chicago is known for its quality of building
design. In fact, with the Chicago School of Architecture as a
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cornerstone, many feel Chicago is the United States' most
architecturally diverse, exciting and attractive city. This
may seem incongruent until one understands Chicago's tradition
of high architectural standards set in place by Daniel
Burnham, Frederick Olmstead, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Louis
Sullivan. With a precedent for quality well-established,
developers and architects apparantly tread lightly. Stringent
controls may not be necessary to continue the tradition of
architectural excellence. In the words of Brian Shea of
Cooper, Robertson + Partner, "Chicago comes from a tradition
of responsible, good architects so the city hasn't suffered
that much [from lack of development controls]." In Bill
Martin's opinion, "there are talented people here, both good
developers and good architects. Besides, when a new building
goes up, it's never going to please 100% of the people.
That's what has given Chicago its diversity." Some would also
add that this diversity has played a important role in
establishing the architectural tradition for which Chicago has
become known.
The design and approval of Cityfront Center "is an
interesting piece of history. A new book was written by the
[CDEV] people." 93 The lessons and experiences of
Cityfront Center will be used in the development of many
future projects. Through ongoing discussions with the city
planning department, the designers of Cityfront Center were
able to design a project which met both the needs of the
public sector (the city and civic interest groups) and the
joint venture partners who were privately developing the
project. These discussions set a precedent for the
development of a working relationship between public and
private entities from which a better project may be planned.
The development guidelines established for Cityfront Center
and published by the city planning department have been used
as a model for the creation of guidelines for other developing
areas in Chicago. Finally, the previous experience of
Alexander Cooper was valuable in the design of the master plan
for Cityfront Center. His approach to the project of
aggregating open spaces, maintaining view corridors, and
establishing access to the waterfront can be used in the
design of future large-scale developments.
For many years, the City of Chicago has pushed for new
development. This goal is reflected in the as-of-right zoning
established for the city, in the relative leniency a developer
has in designing a project (as compared to a number of other
major cities), and even in the limited size and power of the
Chicago planning department. Nonetheless, Chicago has long
been known for its fine architecture. One hypothesis which
may be made is this excellence in design has caused architects
to respect the tradition of quality that has been established
in Chicago and to "tread lightly" when designing new
developments.
Despite the fact that it may be easier to develop in
Chicago, in the words of Jack Guthman, CDEV's zoning counsel,
the approval process for Cityfront Center was "incredibly hard
work." The city, civic interest groups, and the developers
are pleased with the results of their time and effort. Since
the approval of the Cityfront Center plan, Mary Decker of the
Metropolitan Planning Council has noted that "everyone
[involved in the project] wants to take credit for its
approval. That's the sign of a good deal." The project may
have been summed up best by Planning Commission Chairman Miles
Berger upon the Planning Commission's approval of Cityfront
Center's Plan for Development: "It is approved. Very handsome
plan. Very handsome plan."
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EXHIBIT E
CHICAGO CIVIC GROUPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
APPROVAL OF CITYFRONT CENTER
Chicago Central Area Committee - civic organization dedicated
to urban research and development. Its primary goal is to
preserve the economic vitality of Chicago and to act as a
catalyst to create a strong downtown.
Friends of Downtown - citizen-based organization concerned
with promoting the vitality, diversity, and attractiveness of
downtown Chicago.
Friends of the Parks - community organization dedicated to the
preservation, protection, and improvement of parks in Chicago.
Friends of the River - advocacy group dedicated to protecting
and improving the Chicago River system.
Landmarks Preservation Council - founded to preserve the
character and vitality provided to Illinois' cities, towns,
and neighborhoods by historic architecture.
Metropolitan Planning Council - dedicated to initiating and
promoting comprehensive programs and policies that help (the
Chicago region) cope with growth and change.
Open Lands Project - dedicated to increasing the quality and
quantity of public open space in northeastern Illinois.
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